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Abstract 
Using indirect inference based on a VAR we confront US data from 1972 to 2007 
with a standard New Keynesian model in which an optimal timeless policy is 
substituted for a Taylor rule. We find the model explains the data both for the Great 
Acceleration and the Great Moderation. The implication is that changing variances of 
shocks caused the reduction of volatility. Smaller Fed policy errors accounted for the 
fall in inflation volatility. Smaller supply shocks accounted for the fall in output 
volatility and smaller demand shocks for lower interest rate volatility. The same 
model with differing Taylor rules of the standard sorts cannot explain the data of 
either episode. But the model with timeless optimal policy could have generated data 
in which Taylor rule regressions could have been found, creating an illusion that 
monetary policy was following such rules. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the breakdown of Bretton Woods in 1972 the US economy behaved first rather 
badly (the ‘Great Acceleration’) and then from sometime in the early 1980s until 
around 2007 rather well (the ‘Great Moderation’). Economists have attempted to 
understand why these two episodes differed so much. Some have argued that 
monetary policy improved; others that the economic environment (the shocks) 
improved. In this paper we build on a DSGE model we have recently calibrated and 
tested for the US in the second of these episodes, extend it to the first and test it for 
that, then use the conclusions of this extended exercise to decompose the changes in 
US behaviour into policy and environment. 
 
Previous efforts to do this have either focused on time-series descriptions of the data 
with rather limited theoretical restrictions or have used DSGE models with rather 
limited testing against the data. The former have tended to point to the environment, 
the latter to monetary policy, as the causes of the improvement. However in the 
former it is hard to identify the role of policy with much confidence, even though the 
facts are well accounted for, while in the latter one cannot be sure the facts are well 
accounted for. We would argue that one requires a method of evaluation that is well-
founded both in theory and in facts. 
 
The method we use here like the first group of authors uses time-series methods to 
describe the data—a VAR in fact as they do. We combine this with a DSGE model 
which is tested for consistency with the facts on the basis of its ability to replicate the 
VAR behaviour found in the data. Thus the DSGE model we use to explain the 
causality is one that cannot be rejected by the facts as represented by the VAR. In so 
doing we believe we are using both theory and data in harness. Establishing causality 
can only be done by theory but in our case that theory is the one that accounts for the 
facts.  
 
In what follows we first survey the recent literature just summarised (section 2). We 
then explain our own DSGE theory (section 3), while in section 4 we explain the tests 
we use to evaluate it against the facts and carry out our decomposition of the causes of 
the improvement in US behaviour between the two episodes. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. The Great Moderation in the US and Its Determinants  
 
The Great Moderation refers to the period during which the volatility of the main 
economic variables was relatively modest. This began in the US around the early 80s 
although there is no consensus on the exact date. Figure 2.1 below shows the time 
paths of three main US macro variables from 1972 to 2007: the nominal Fed interest 
rate, the output gap
1
 and CPI inflation. It shows that the massive fluctuations of the 
70s ceased after the early 80s, indicating the economy’s transition from the Great 
Acceleration to the Great Moderation.  
 
 
              Figure 2.1: Time Paths of Main Macro Variables of the US Economy 
                                        
                                              (Quarterly Data, 1972-2007) 
                                      
    Nominal Quarterly Fed Rate                         Output Gap                            Quarterly CPI Inflation                                
 
           
 
Data source: the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/, accessed 
November 2009). Fed rate and inflation unfiltered; the output gap is the log deviation of real GDP from 
its HP trend. 
 
 
While a number of factors might have helped to explain the US Moderation, good 
shocks and good policy have been the two focused on. In particular, based on 
structural VAR analysis, Stock and Watson (2002) claimed that over 70% of the 
reduction in GDP volatility was due to luck in the form of lower shocks to 
productivity, commodity prices and forecast errors. Primiceri (2005) focused on the 
rate of inflation and unemployment, arguing that the stagflation in the 70s was better 
explained by non-policy shocks than by the Fed’s less active role in stabilization; a 
                                                 
1
 Note the output gap here is defined as the percentage deviation of real GDP from its HP trend. We 
plot this series instead of the actual output usually discussed in the context of Great Moderation as this 
is what our baseline model will predict. Yet the actual data show the correlation coefficient between 
these two series is as high as 0.98. 
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similar conclusion was drawn by Gambetti, Pappa and Canova (2008). Sims and Zha 
(2006) found in the same vein that an empirical model with variation only in the 
variance of the structural disturbance fitted the data best and that alteration in the 
monetary regime—even if assumed to occur—would not much influence the observed 
inflation dynamics.   
 
The logic underlying the structural VAR approach is that, when actual data are 
modelled with a structural VAR, their dynamics will be determined both by the VAR 
coefficient matrix reflecting the propagation mechanism (including the structure of 
the economy and the policy regime in place), and by the variance-covariance matrix 
of prediction errors which takes into account the impact caused by exogenous 
disturbances. Hence, by analysing the variation of these two matrices across different 
subsamples, it is possible to work out whether it is the change in the propagation 
mechanism or in the error variability that has caused the change in the data variability. 
It is the second that these studies have identified as the dominant cause. Hence almost 
all these structural VAR analyses have suggested good shocks as the main cause of 
the Moderation with the change of policy regime in a negligible role. 
 
Nevertheless, since this structural VAR approach relies on supposed model 
restrictions to decompose the variations in the VAR between its coefficient matrix and 
the variance-covariance matrix of its prediction errors, there is a pervasive 
identification problem. As Benati and Surico (2009) have argued, the problem that 
‘lies at the very heart’ of this approach is the difficulty in connecting the structure of a 
DSGE model to the structure of a VAR.  
 
Thus many authors have taken the alternative approach of basing their analysis 
directly on a DSGE model. The DSGE approach to the Great Moderation focuses on 
how changes in the propagation mechanism of the model, and especially in the policy 
regime, would affect the dynamics of the economy. Typically the model is the three-
equation New Keynesian framework, consisting of the ‘IS’ curve derived from the 
representative agent’s optimization problem, the Phillips curve (PP) derived from the 
firm’s optimal price-setting behaviour, and a Taylor rule approximating the Fed’s 
monetary policy. Based on counterfactual experiments, this approach generally 
suggests that the US economy’s improved stability was largely due to stronger 
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monetary policy responses to inflation rather than due to better shocks (Clarida, Gali 
and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and 
Benati and Surico (2009) are examples). The contrast was made between the ‘passive’ 
monetary policy of the 1970s, with low Taylor rule responses, and the ‘active’ policy 
of the later period in which the conditions for a unique stable equilibrium (the Taylor 
Principle in this context) are met, these normally being that the inflation response in 
the Taylor rule be greater than unity.   
 
Thus Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) claimed that the passive interest rate response 
adopted by the Fed in 1970s led the US economy into a region of indeterminacy, 
within which ‘sunspot fluctuations’ (appearing as the Great Acceleration) would arise 
as a result of self-fulfilling behaviour. Hence the Great Moderation in the 80s was 
essentially due to the Fed’s switchover from this passive regime to an active one in 
which the Taylor Principle was observed, so moving the economy into the region of 
determinacy.
2
 
 
However, while such a NK-Taylor rule approach to the Great Moderation is supported 
by qualitative analysis of this sort, the explanation is invalidated if the models being 
used are strongly rejected by the data. Yet in an earlier paper (Minford and Ou, 2010) 
we found that these models fitted post-1982 US history rather poorly. The problem 
lay in the representation of monetary policy by a Taylor rule; when this was replaced 
by the assumption of an optimising policy, the model was not rejected.  
 
In these tests we used the ability of the DSGE model to replicate the description of the 
facts provided by a VAR. Thus we were combining the two elements in this literature 
of episode comparison: the VAR description and the DSGE causal framework. What 
we found in effect for the post-1982 period was that the DSGE model accounting for 
the facts as described by a VAR was one in which monetary policy was modelled by 
the optimal timeless rule. We therefore proceed here to investigate if the same or 
some other model could account as well for the facts of the earlier period. With such 
an account we could then compare the two episodes and their causes. We go on to 
explain the steps involved in the rest of this paper. 
                                                 
2
 With full-model estimation, Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) found that the US economy was in a 
region of indeterminacy before 1980 but was in one of determinacy afterwards. 
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3. A Simple New Keynesian Model of the US Economy   
 
Having tested three popular hypothetical alternatives, we found in our earlier paper 
that the only NK model not strongly rejected by the post-1982 US data was the one 
where the Fed’s policy was to pursue the optimal tiles rule3. This model is: 
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~
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4
.  
 
This is a fully micro-founded NK model, with equation [3.1] denoting the ‘IS’ curve 
derived from the representative agent’s optimization problem and output market-
clearing, equation [3.2] representing the Phillips curve implied by firms’ optimal 
price-setting behaviour under Calvo (1983) contracts, and equation [3.3]—the 
targeting rule—being the optimality condition to be ensured when the monetary 
authority commits to minimize a quadratic social welfare loss function in timeless 
perspective
5
. Stochastic shocks embedded in the system are the ‘demand 
disturbance’ tv , the wage-setting ‘supply disturbance’
w
tu  and a ‘trembling-hand policy 
disturbance’ t ; they are each assumed to follow an AR(1) process. 
 
Compared to the usual three-equation NK framework with a Taylor rule, in this the 
Fed’s policy is to adjust the nominal interest rate so that the economic relationship 
described in [3.3] (with t =0) is caused to occur. This rule is implicit, in the sense 
                                                 
3
 The other two models rejected assumed the original Taylor rule and its interest rate-smoothed version 
as the Fed’s policy, respectively. 
4
 That is, ti
~
percentage deviation of interest rate from its steady-state level, tx output gap and, 
t inflation. 
5
 Note that   and   are functions of other structural parameters and some steady-state relationships, 
and   is the relative weight the Fed puts on loss from output variations against inflation variations 
(See table 4.1 for calibrations in the next section for details). Full derivations of the model are available 
in the Supporting Annex to Minford and Ou (2010) on the Cardiff Business School working paper 
webpage at: http://www.cf.ac.uk/carbs/faculty/minfordp/E2009_19Annex.pdf.   
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that the Fed effectively is solving the model for the interest rate, output gap and 
inflation that satisfy the three equations; it then chooses to set that solution interest 
rate which in turn pins down the other solution values for inflation and output gap.  
 
 
4. Confronting the Model with Facts 
 
4.1. Testing the Baseline Model of US using Indirect Inference 
 
Methodology    
 
We use the method of indirect inference to evaluate the baseline model’s validity in 
explaining the US history. The general idea of this method is that, when a theoretical 
model is tested against the actual data, an auxiliary model that is completely 
independent of the theoretical one is employed to produce descriptors of the data 
against which the performance of the theory can be evaluated indirectly. Such 
descriptors can be either the estimated parameters of the auxiliary model or functions 
of these. While these are treated as the ‘reality’, the theoretical model being evaluated 
is simulated to find its implied values for them. 
 
Indirect inference has been widely used in the estimation of structural models (e.g., 
Smith (1993), Gregory and Smith (1991, 1993), Gourieroux et al. (1993), Gourieroux 
and Monfort (1996) and Canova (2005)). Here we make a different use of indirect 
inference as our aim is to evaluate an already estimated or calibrated structural model
6
. 
The common element is the use of an auxiliary time series model. In estimation the 
parameters of the structural model are chosen so that when this model is simulated it 
generates estimates of the auxiliary model similar to those obtained from the actual 
data. The optimal choices of parameters for the structural model are those which 
minimise the distance between a given function of the two sets of estimated 
coefficients of the auxiliary model. Common choices of this function are the actual 
coefficients, the scores or the impulse response functions. In model evaluation the 
parameters of the structural model are taken as given. The aim is to compare the 
                                                 
6
 Recent applications of this technique include Minford, Theodoridis and Meenagh (2009), Meenagh, 
Minford and Wickens (2009), Le, et al. (2009, 2010) and Minford and Ou (2010). 
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performance of the auxiliary model estimated on simulated data derived from the 
given estimates of a structural model—which is taken as the true model of the 
economy, the null hypothesis—with the performance of the auxiliary model when 
estimated from the actual data. If the structural model is correct then its predictions 
about the impulse responses, moments and time series properties of the data should 
statistically match those based on the actual data: the comparison is based on the 
distribution of those properties under the null hypothesis of the structural model. In 
our comparisons here we use as the relevant properties the VAR parameters 
themselves (since the impulse response functions that are our primary interest are 
weighted averages of these, which therefore serve as a parsimonious representation of 
them); and also the variances of the data to ensure that the model is sized correctly. 
We call these the ‘chosen features’ of the data description. 
 
The detailed testing procedure therefore involves first constructing the errors derived 
from the previously estimated structural model and the actual data. These errors are 
then bootstrapped and used to generate for each bootstrap new data based on the 
structural model. An auxiliary time series model (a VAR in our case) is then fitted to 
each set of data and the sampling distribution of the chosen features is obtained from 
these estimates. Finally a Wald statistic is computed that determines whether the 
chosen features estimated on the actual data lie in some confidence interval implied 
by this sampling distribution
7
. 
 
We take, as in Minford and Ou (2010), a VAR(1) as the appropriate auxiliary model 
for the macro variables, namely the nominal interest rate, the output gap and inflation. 
Our chosen features of the data are then summarised by nine autoregressive 
coefficients and three variances of the involved variables. The Wald statistic is 
                                                 
7
 While more details of this ‘three-step’ testing procedure can be found in Minford, Theodoridis and 
Meenagh (2009), Meenagh, Minford and Wickens (2009), Le, et al. (2009, 2010), it is worth  
emphasizing that the simulated sampling distribution of the relevant parameters of the auxiliary model 
is generated based on bootstrapping the innovations implied by the data and the theoretical model. 
Such a bootstrapped distribution is generally more accurate for small samples than the asymptotic 
distribution and is shown to be consistent by Le et al. (2010) given that the Wald statistic is 
‘asymptotically pivotal’; it also has quite good accuracy in small sample Montecarlo experiments 
according to Le et al. (2010). In particular, in this paper we draw the bootstraps as time vectors, so that 
any contemporaneous correlation between the innovations is preserved.  
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computed from these
8
. In other words, we are concerned with the model’s capacity to 
capture the observed dynamics and variability of the economy as summed up by the 
VAR and the data variances. The Wald statistic is given by: 
                                                       )()'(
1
)( 


                                  [4.1] 
where  is the vector of chosen features in the data, with  and )(  representing 
respectively the means and variance-covariance matrix of these estimates calculated 
across the simulations. The whole test procedure can be illustrated diagrammatically 
in figure 4.1 as follows: 
 
 
                          Figure 4.1: The Principle of Testing using Indirect Inference  
                               
                                                                        Panel A:  
                                                                                                     
                                                                                                     Model(s) to be tested     
                                                                                                ↓         (Bootstrap simulations) 
                        Actual data                                                         Simulated data 
                              ↓                                                                           ↓  
                  VAR representation                                              VAR representation 
                                    ↓                                                                           ↓ 
                The VAR inference (the ‘reality’)          vs.         Distribution(s) of the VAR inference                     
                              
                                                                  
                                                                   Wald statistic 
                                                         
                                                                       Panel B: 
     
 
 
While the first panel in figure 4.1 summarises the main steps of the methodology just 
described, the mountain-shaped diagram replicated from Meenagh, Minford and 
                                                 
8
 Note that the VAR impulse response functions, the co-variances, as well as the auto/cross correlations 
of the left-hand-side variables will all be implicitly examined when the VAR coefficient matrix is 
considered, since the former are functions of the latter. 
  9 
Wickens (2009) in panel B gives an example of how ‘reality’ is compared to the 
model’s predictions using the Wald test when two parameters (reflecting the chosen 
features of data) are considered: let either of the spots in panel B indicate the real-
data-based estimates of the chosen features and the mountain represents their 
corresponding joint distribution generated from model simulations; when the real-
data-based estimates are given at point A, the theoretical model in hand will fail to 
provide a sensible explanation for the real world, since what the model predicts is too 
far away from what reality suggests; this is in contrast to the case when the real-data-
based estimates are given at point B, which, according to the diagram, means the 
reality is captured by the joint distribution of the chosen features implied by the model. 
The reported Wald statistic formally evaluates these distances.  
 
Data and Calibration 
 
We test the model against the US experience since the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods system using quarterly data published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis from 1972Q1 to 2007Q4
9
. This covers both the Great Acceleration and the 
Great Moderation episodes of the US history.  
 
The time series involved for the given baseline model include ti
~
, measured as the 
deviation of the current Fed rate from its steady-state value, the output gap tx , 
approximated by the percentage deviation of real GDP from its HP trend, and the 
quarterly rate of inflation t , defined as the log difference between the current CPI 
and the CPI captured in the last quarter
10
.  
 
We should find a break in the VAR process reflecting the start of the Great 
Moderation. Accordingly we split the time series into two subsamples and estimate 
the VAR representation before and after the break; the baseline model is then 
evaluated against the VAR of each subsample separately. We set the break at 1982Q3. 
                                                 
9
 Data base of Federal Bank of St. Louis: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ (accessed November 
2009). 
10
 Notice that the annual Fed rates obtained from the FRED® are purposely adjusted into quarterly 
rates such that the frequencies of all time series are kept consistently on quarterly basis. We also 
assume zero-inflation steady state so that the steady-state value of nominal interest rate i  is given by: 
11  i . 
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This makes the Moderation episode consistent with the data sample used in Minford 
and Ou (2010) and is also supported by the Qu and Perron (2007) test which suggests 
a break at 1984Q3, with 95% confidence interval between 1980Q1 and 1984Q4 (See 
table A.1 in appendix for the Qu-Perron test results).  
 
For simplicity, the data we use are demeaned so that a VAR(1) representation of them 
contains no constants but only nine autoregressive parameters in the coefficient 
matrix; a linear trend is also taken out of the interest rate series for the post-break 
sample to ensure stationarity (see figure A.1 and table A.2 in appendix for plots of all 
the time series and the relevant unit root test results).   
 
The model is calibrated by choosing the parameters commonly accepted for the US 
economy in the literature. Their values are listed in table 4.1 as follows: 
 
                                            Table 4.1: Calibration of Parameters 
 
  Parameters               Definitions                                                            Calibrated values 
                 time discount factor                                                                              0.99 
                 inverse of elasticity of intertemporal consumption                              2 
                        inverse of elasticity of labour                                                               3 
                       Calvo contract price non-adjusting probability                                    0.53 
    YG                steady-state government expenditure to output ratio
11                        0.23 
CY                steady-state output to consumption ratio                                             1/0.77             (implied) 
                 



)1)(1( 
                                                                               0.42               (implied) 
                 )(
C
Y
                                                                                      2.36               (implied) 
                  price elasticity of demand                                                                    6 
 1        parameter driving the optimal timeless policy12                                  1/6                 (implied) 
       v              autoregressive coefficient of demand disturbance   (pre-break)           0.88    (sample estimate) 
     wu
            autoregressive coefficient of supply disturbance     (pre-break)           0.91    (sample estimate) 
                    autoregressive coefficient of policy disturbance      (pre-break)           0.59    (sample estimate) 
      v               autoregressive coefficient of demand disturbance   (post-break)         0.93    (sample estimate) 
    wu
             autoregressive coefficient of supply disturbance     (post-break)         0.80    (sample estimate) 
                   autoregressive coefficient of policy disturbance     (post-break)          0.38    (sample estimate) 
 
                                                 
11
 We assumed Y=C+G and used the steady-state G/Y ratio to calculate the steady-state Y/C ratio. 
12
 Nistico (2007) showed that the relative weight the central bank puts on output volatility in a micro-
founded quadratic social welfare loss function is equal to the ratio of the slope of the New Keynesian 
Phillips curve to the price elasticity of demand, i.e.,  / . 
  11 
 
As table 4.1 shows, the quarterly time discount rate is calibrated as 0.99, implying an 
approximately 1% quarterly (or equivalently 4% annual) rate of interest in steady state. 
 and   are set to as high as 2 and 3 respectively as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2008), 
who emphasized the values’ consistency with the inelasticity evident in US data for  
both intertemporal consumption and labour supply. The Calvo price stickiness of 0.53 
and the price elasticity of demand of 6 are both taken from Kuester, Muller and 
Stolting (2009): these values imply a contract length of more than three quarters
13
 and 
a constant mark-up of price to nominal marginal cost of 1.2. The implied steady-state 
output-consumption ratio of 1/0.77 is calculated based on the steady-state ratio of 
government expenditure to output of 0.23 calibrated in Foley and Taylor (2004). The 
last six lines in table 4.1 also report the autoregressive coefficients of the structural 
disturbances implied by the model, which are all sample estimates from the data in 
our subsamples
14
. Notice that in both the Great Acceleration and Great Moderation 
the demand and supply shocks are found to be highly persistent, in contrast to the 
policy shocks. 
 
 
Results 
 
The model’s performance in each subsample is evaluated in this section. In particular, 
since we have chosen the dynamics and size of the actual data for the model to fit, in 
evaluation this involves examining both the autoregressive coefficients of the VAR(1) 
representation and the variances of the L.H.S. variables of it
15
. We do this using the 
Wald test by checking on two kinds of Wald statistic; that is, a ‘directed’ Wald that 
accounts only for a particular aspect of the chosen features, and a ‘full’ Wald where 
all the chosen features of the data are jointly considered. 
 
 
                                                 
13
 To be accurate, 26.312 1  . 
14
 These estimates are all significant at the 5% significance level. 
15
 Note that the VAR(1) representation is assumed to take the form: 
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Model performance in the Great Moderation: 
  
We first replicate with the data we use here the results in our earlier paper (Minford 
and Ou, 2010) in which we focused on the model’s performance over the post-1982 
data period, the Great Moderation subsample here. Table 4.2 shows the results
16
. 
 
 
       Table 4.2: Evaluating the Model with the Optimal Timeless Rule in the Great Moderation    
 
                             Panel A: Individual VAR Coefficients—Directed Wald Statistic  
 
          VAR(1)                         95%                         95%                        Values estimated                        In/Out 
      Coefficients               lower bound            upper bound                     with real data   
   11                          0.7408                     0.9689                             0.8950                                     In 
   12                        -0.0316                     0.0329                             0.0395                                    Out 
   13                        -0.0709                     0.0896                             0.0315                                     In 
   21                        -0.2618                     0.8132                          -4.28e-05                                   In 
   22                         0.4102                     0.7617                             0.8243                                    Out 
  23                         -0.3954                     0.3056                           -0.0657                                     In 
  31                         -0.3197                     0.2122                             0.0105                                    In 
  32                          0.0050                     0.1735                             0.0979                                    In 
            33                          0.1090                     0.5052                             0.2353                                    In 
                 Directed Wald statistic                                                                                           86.4%  
                      (for dynamics) 
 
 
                  Panel B: Volatilities of the Endogenous Variables—Directed Wald Statistic  
 
   Volatilities of the                 95%                        95%                      Values calculated                          In/Out 
endogenous variables       lower bound          upper bound                    with real data 
         )
~
var(i                         0.0042                     0.0264                             0.0156                                    In 
         )var(x                         0.0686                     0.1627                             0.1620                                    In 
         )var(                         0.0095                     0.0204                             0.0149                                    In 
                   Directed Wald statistic                                                                                          89.6%  
                      (for volatilities)  
Note: Estimates reported in panel B (table 4.2) are magnified by 1000 times as their original values. 
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 The results shown here are numerically different from those in Minford and Ou (2010) due to data 
revision by FRED
®
; in particular, the time series of real GDP, and therefore the output gap, have been 
significantly revised for the 1980s.  
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        Panel C: The Full Wald Statistic  
 
  The concerned model properties                                                                         Full Wald statistic 
   Dynamics + Volatilities                                                                                         77.1% 
 
 
As panel A in table 4.2 shows, while two out of the nine VAR(1) coefficients (i.e., the 
interest rate’s response to the lagged output gap and the output gap’s response to its 
own lagged value) estimated with the actual data are found to lie beyond the 95% 
upper bounds implied by the model, the test returns a directed Wald statistic of 86.4%. 
This means at 95% (or even at 90%) confidence level the real-data-based estimates 
are easily explained by their joint distribution generated from model simulations; it 
indicates the model has in general captured the dynamic features of the data pretty 
precisely. 
 
As far as the size (or variability) of the data is concerned, panel B shows that the 
observed variances of the endogenous variables not only all lie individually within 
their respective 95% bounds, but are also jointly explained by the model at 95% 
confidence (indeed, also marginally at 90%), with the directed Wald statistic at 89.6%; 
our model is therefore also correctly sized compared to the actual data. 
 
To evaluate how the model behaves in fitting the facts in an overall sense, we now 
consider the full Wald where the VAR(1) coefficients and the variances of the data 
are simultaneously taken into account. This is reported in panel C as 77.1%. Such a 
low Wald statistic indicates that what we observe in reality is fairly close to what the 
model on average predicts; thus even at 90% confidence level the data do not reject 
the model jointly on both dynamics and size. Hence, we conclude our model cannot 
be rejected as the data-generating process for the US economy in the episode of the 
Great Moderation. 
 
This is not the case, however, when a standard Taylor rule is substituted for the 
optimal timeless rule assumed above. Table 4.3 replicates this result from our earlier 
paper on the latest data. It can be seen that when [3.3] is replaced with the original 
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Taylor rule or its interest rate-smoothed version with commonly accepted calibrations, 
the data in the same subsample strongly reject the model at 99%
17
.  
 
              Table 4.3: Wald Statistics for Typical Taylor Rule Models in the Great Moderation  
 
 
 
Model performance in the Great Acceleration: 
 
We now proceed to evaluate how the model with the optimal timeless rule behaves 
before 1982, i.e., in the Great Acceleration subsample. Table 4.4 shows the results. 
 
           Table 4.4: Evaluating the Model with the optimal timeless Rule in the Great Acceleration 
   
                        Panel A: Individual VAR Coefficients—Directed Wald Statistic  
 
VAR(1)                          95%                         95%                        Values estimated                       In/Out 
Coefficients                lower bound            upper bound                     with real data   
   11                            0.4146                     1.0629                               0.9519                                 In 
   12                          -0.2505                     0.1274                               0.0592                                 In 
   13                          -0.8794                     0.5251                              -0.1089                                 In 
   21                          -0.3401                     0.3581                              -0.5006                                Out 
   22                           0.6090                     0.9994                               0.9474                                 In 
  23                          -0.8439                      0.7108                              -0.4702                                In 
  31                           -0.1360                     0.1962                               0.1398                                 In 
  32                          -0.0551                      0.1566                               0.0865                                 In 
            33                          -0.0147                      0.7576                               0.5490                                 In 
                  Directed Wald statistic                                                                                            98.2%  
                      (for dynamics) 
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 This is the exercise conducted in Minford and Ou (2010). Note we have assumed the interest rate-
smoothed Taylor rule takes the form
tttxtt ixi    1
~
])[1(
~
, with 
  ttt  1 ; we 
also set  76.0 , 44.1  and 14.0x . The rule contains no constant as demeaned data are used. 
                                                                       Taylor rule model versions 
     Chosen features               with original Taylor rule     with interest rate-smoothed Taylor rule 
 
       Directed Wald                             100%                                              99.8% 
     (dynamics only) 
 
       Directed Wald                             99.2%                                              99% 
     (volatilities only) 
 
           Full Wald                                100%                                              99.7% 
(dynamics + volatilities) 
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                Panel B: Volatilities of the Endogenous Variables—Directed Wald Statistic  
 
   Volatilities of the                   95%                        95%                       Values calculated                       In/Out    
endogenous variables        lower bound          upper bound                     with real data 
         )
~
var(i                          0.0905                   0.6543                               0.0841                                Out 
         )var(x                           0.1559                    1.4                                    0.7420                                 In 
         )var(                          0.0262                   0.0722                               0.0586                                 In 
                 Directed Wald statistic                                                                                           89.6%  
                     (for volatilities) 
Note: Estimates reported in panel B (table 4.4) are magnified by 1000 times as their original values. 
 
 
 
           Panel C: Full Wald Statistic  
 
   The concerned model properties                                                                      Full Wald statistic 
    Dynamics + Volatilities                                                                                          97.3% 
 
 
The first panel in table 4.4 shows the VAR(1) coefficients estimated with the actual 
data are well captured by their respective 95% bounds implied by the model, apart 
from 21  which lies below its lower limit—thus at 95% confidence level the model 
overpredicts this partial response of the output gap to the lagged interest rate. The 
directed Wald statistic at 98.2% shows that these estimates, though individually 
almost all within their 95% bounds, are jointly rejected at 95% but not at 99%.  
 
Turning to the model’s performance in fitting the data size, panel B suggests that 
except for the variance of the interest rate, which is slightly overpredicted by the 
model, the variances lie well within the model-implied 95% bounds. The directed 
Wald statistic at 89.6% lies within 90% confidence bounds.   
 
Overall, when we combine all features of the data, the full Wald statistic in panel C is 
97.3% and so fails to be rejected at confidence levels between 95 and 99%. So while 
the model fits the facts less well than in the case of the Moderation subsample, it still 
fits those of the turbulent Acceleration episode reasonably well. 
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Unfortunately we are unable to test the DSGE model with the generally proposed pre-
1982 Taylor rules because the solution is indeterminate, the model not satisfying the 
Taylor Principle. Such models have a sunspot solution and therefore any outcome is 
possible and also consistent formally with the theory. The assertion of those 
supporting such models is that the solutions, being sunspots, accounted for the 
volatility of inflation. Unfortunately there is no way of testing such an assertion. Since 
a sunspot can be anything, any solution for inflation that occurred implies such a 
sunspot—equally of course it might not be due to a sunspot, rather it could be due to 
some other unspecified model. There is no way of telling. To put the matter 
technically in terms of indirect inference testing using the bootstrap, we can solve the 
model for the sunspots that must have occurred to generate the outcomes; however, 
the sunspots that occurred cannot be meaningfully bootstrapped because by definition 
the sunspot variance is infinite. Values drawn from an infinite-variance distribution 
cannot give a valid estimate of the distribution, as they will represent it with a finite-
variance distribution. To draw representative random values we would have to impose 
an infinite variance; by implication all possible outcomes would be embraced by the 
simulations of the model and hence the model cannot be falsified. Thus the pre-1982 
Taylor rule DSGE model proposed is not a testable theory of this period. 
 
However, it is open to us to test the model with a pre-1982 Taylor rule that gives a 
determinate solution; we do this by making the Taylor rule as unresponsive to 
inflation as is consistent with determinacy, implying a long-run inflation response of 
just above unity. Such a rule shows considerably more monetary ‘weakness’ than the 
rule typically used for the post-1982 period, when the long-run response of interest 
rates to inflation was 1.5 in the rule without smoothing and as high as 6 in the rule 
with smoothing which is the one that fits the data least badly. 
 
We implement this weak Taylor rule across a spectrum of combinations of smoothing 
coefficient and short-run response to inflation, with in all cases the long-run 
coefficient equalling 1.001. The Wald statistics are shown in Table 4.5.  
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             Table 4.5: Wald Statistics for ‘Weak’ Taylor Rule Models in the Great Acceleration   
(with ‘weak’ rule defined as having a long-run interest rate response to inflation equalling 1.001) 
 
 
What we see here is that with a low smoothing coefficient the model encompasses the 
variance of the data well, in other words picking up the Great Acceleration. However, 
when it does so, the data dynamics reject the model very strongly. If one increases the 
smoothing coefficient, the model is rejected less strongly by the data dynamics and 
also overall but it is then increasingly at odds with the data variances. In all cases the 
model is rejected strongly overall by the data, though least badly with the highest 
smoothing coefficient. Thus the testable model that gets nearest to the position that 
the shift in behaviour was due to the shift in Taylor rule coefficients is rejected most 
conclusively. 
 
Ireland’s alternative Taylor rule representation of Fed policy: 
 
                                                 
18
 T-value normalization of the Wald statistics is calculated based on Wilson and Hilferty (1931)’s 
method of transforming a chi-squared distribution into a standard normal distribution. The formula we 
use takes the form: 645.1]})2()2/[(])2()2{[( 2
1
2
195
2
1
2
1
 nMnM
thsqusqu , where squM is 
the square of the Mahalanobis distance calculated from equation [4.1] with actual data, 
thsquM
95
 is its 
corresponding 95% critical value on the simulated (chi-squared) distribution, n is the degrees of 
freedom of the variate, and Z is the normalized test statistic; it can be derived by employing a square 
root and assuming n tends to infinity when the Wilson and Hilferty (1931)’s transformation is 
performed.     
 
     Taylor rule: 
tttt ii    1
~~
                            Wald statistics for chosen features 
                                                                                                    (Normalized t-values in parenthesis
18
) 
 
Rule parameters   Dynamics of error process     Directed Wald      Directed Wald                Full Wald 
                                estimated from data            for dynamics         for volatilities     for dynamics & volatilities                                                                    
 
001.1,0          )1(~ ARt                   100%                    78.9%                          100% 
                                                                                  (39.81)                   (0.22)                         (40.24) 
    
7007.0,3.0           )1(~ ARt                  100%                      92%                            100% 
                                                                                  (30.26)                   (1.08)                         (28.01) 
 
5005.0,5.0           )1(~ ARt                  100%                     95.9%                          100% 
                                                                                  (22.69)                  (1.77)                          (21.98) 
 
3003.0,7.0            iidt ~                    100%                    98.2%                          100% 
                                                                                  (19.26)                  (2.73)                          (18.24) 
 
1001.0,9.0              iidt ~                    100%                     99%                            100%                              
                                                                                  (9.09)                   (3.56)                           (9.03)                    
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A recent paper by Ireland (2007), unlike the other New Keynesian authors we have 
cited above, estimates a model in which there is a non-standard Taylor rule that is 
held constant across both post-war episodes. His policy rule always satisfies the 
Taylor Principle because unusually it is the change in interest rates that is set in 
response to inflation and the output gap so that the long-run response to inflation is 
infinite. He distinguishes the policy actions of the Fed between the two subperiods not 
by changes in the rule’s coefficients but by a time-varying inflation target which he 
treats under the assumptions of ‘opportunism’ largely as a function of the shocks to 
the economy. Ireland’s model like ours here implies that the cause of the Great 
Moderation is the fall in shock variances. However the difference is that it attributes 
the policy variance change partly to the change in the variance of the inflation target, 
whereas ours attributes it entirely to the change in the variance of the policy 
(‘trembling hand’) error. 
 
A full test of Ireland’s model by our methods cannot be carried out here because his 
model restricts the target-related part of the error in his Taylor rule to be a function of 
the other errors in his model according to his opportunistic theory of policy target 
choice; as our model here is different from his in a variety of ways, we cannot test his 
restrictions on our model. However, we can test his model in unrestricted form, where 
we let his particular Taylor rule error be freely determined by the data. Table 4.6 
shows the results of this exercise.                 
 
                Table 4.6: Wald Statistics for the Baseline Model with Ireland-type Policy  
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 Ireland (2007)’s original rule takes the form: 
ttttgttt ggii  
**
1 )(
~~
  , where 
*
t  is the inflation target, tg  is the output growth rate and g  is its steady-state level. In our exercise 
here we test its unrestricted form, where 
ttgttt ggii     )(
~~
1
 and 
tttt 
**   . In 
particular, we rewrite the unrestricted rule as 
tttgttt xxii     )(
~~
11
 so that it can be evaluated 
within our baseline framework; such an equivalent transformation is derived by writing:  
11111 )ln(lnlnln)ln(lnlnln   tt
hptr
tt
hptr
tt
hptr
t
hptr
tttt xxyyyyyyyygg . 
       
            Wald statistics                      Ireland’s rule in unrestricted form: 
ttgttt ggii     )(
~~
1
     
         for chosen features                    & equivalent transformation
19
: 
tttgttt xxii    )(
~~
11
 
 
                                                                     pre-1982 sample                             post-1982 sample 
 
 
            Directed Wald                                         98.9%                                              79.0% 
             for dynamics                                             
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 Note: 1. Ireland (2007)’s ML estimates suggest 23.0,91.0  g  . 
            2. All equation errors follow an AR(1) process according to the data and model.            
 
 
It turns out that Ireland’s model is hardly distinguishable from our optimal timeless 
rule model. His Taylor rule changes interest rates until the optimal timeless rule is 
satisfied, in effect forcing it on the economy. Alternatively we can write his rule as a 
rule for inflation determination (i.e. with inflation on the left hand side), which reveals 
that it is identical to the timeless rule’s setting of inflation apart from the term in the 
change in interest rates and some slight difference in the coefficient on output gap 
change
20
. Since the Ireland rule is so similar to the timeless optimal rule, it is not 
surprising that the Wald statistics for it are hardly different: 71.1% in the Great 
Moderation (against 77.1% for the optimal timeless rule model) and 98.1% in the 
Great Acceleration (against 97.3%). 
 
Ireland’s Taylor rule can in principle be distinguished from the optimal timeless rule 
via his restriction on the rule’s error. As noted earlier we cannot apply this restriction 
within our model so that Ireland’s Taylor rule in its unrestricted form here only differs 
materially from the optimal timeless rule in the interpretation of the error. But from a 
welfare viewpoint it makes little difference whether the cause of the policy error is 
excessive target variation or excessively variable mistakes in policy setting; the 
former can be seen as a type of policy mistake. Thus both versions of the rule imply 
that what changed in it between the two subperiods was the policy error. 
  
It might be argued that the success of Ireland’s rule reveals that a type of Taylor rule 
does after all explain the data. This would be true. But in the context of the debate 
over the cause of the Great Moderation it is to be firmly distinguished from what we 
call the ‘standard Taylor rule’ under which policy shifts in the rule are regarded as the 
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 Note the Ireland rule 
tttgttt xxii     )(
~~
11
 can be rewritten as 
tttttt xxii
g 
 


1
11
1 )()
~~
(    that mimics the optimal timeless rule [3.3]; its coefficient on 
output gap change, according to Ireland’s estimation, is 0.25, close to that of 0.17 in the latter.     
             
            Directed Wald                                           78.8%                                            89.4% 
            for volatilities                       
                       
               Full Wald                                               98.1%                                            71.1% 
   for dynamics & volatilities                                 
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cause. In Ireland’s rule there are no such shifts and as we have seen the behaviour 
under it is essentially identical to that from the optimal timeless rule. This finding and 
its corollaries are the key contributions of this paper, however one chooses to describe 
the rule.  
 
Concluding remarks on the comparison of the optimal timeless rule and the Taylor 
rule: 
 
While by contrast our chosen DSGE model with the optimal timeless rule has more 
trouble explaining the pre-1982 period than the post-1982, it is therefore not rejected 
at reasonable levels of confidence. So we suggest that it is worth investigating what it 
implies as a causal explanation of the shift in behaviour between the periods. If this 
model is the true data-generating mechanism of US history since the early 70s, it does 
of course imply that there was no structural shift in the parameters between the two 
periods since it is the same model that we have used to fit both periods. Accordingly it 
also implies that the changes were due to the errors. We now go on to investigate in 
more detail how the errors changed according to the DSGE model. 
 
 
4.2. Evaluating the Impacts of Shocks—a Variance Decomposition Analysis  
 
Table 4.7 outlines the size of structural errors for both episodes according to our 
baseline model and the actual data.               
     
                                              Table 4.7: The Shrinking Size of Shocks 
Note: 1. Values in parenthesis are sample estimates of standard deviation of innovation. 
           2. Standard deviation of shocks is calculated using formula sd(err.)=sd(innov.)/(1-rho) where rho is the AR(1)  
               coefficient: shocks in both episodes are all shown to follow an AR(1) process. The values of rhos are given  
               in calibration table 4.1.  
                   
 Standard deviation of                                   Pre-1982                                Post-1982                    
 
     Demand shock                                            0.0358                                     0.0143 
                                                                   (0.0043)                                  (0.0010) 
       
     Supply shock                                              0.7867                                     0.1595 
                                                                   (0.0708)                                  (0.0319) 
           
     Policy shock                                              0.0132                                     0.0053                                                                                  
                                                                      (0.0054)                                  (0.0033) 
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As the figures show, the standard deviations of the shocks generally fall sharply after 
the break in 1982. The standard deviation of the demand and policy shock each fell by 
60%, while that of the supply shock fell by a massive 80%; of this 80% drop just 
under half was due to the fall in the persistence of the shock. 
 
We can evaluate the impact of these shocks on the economy by decomposing the 
variance of the variables involved. 
 
         Table 4.8: Variance Decomposition for the Model with the optimal timeless rule 
 
 
Table 4.8 shows that the model is operating in a recursive manner. The output gap is 
dominated by the Phillips curve (‘supply’) shocks, while inflation is dominated by 
monetary policy shocks. With output gap and inflation set entirely independently of 
demand shocks, interest rates move to offset these as well as reacting to output and 
inflation. 
 
To understand this recursiveness, recall that pursuing the optimal timeless policy [3.3] 
requires keeping inflation equal to a fixed fraction of the first difference of the output 
gap. In effect, such a policy constitutes a simultaneous pair with the Phillips curve in 
the model that pins down the equilibrium output gap and inflation; in the optimal 
timeless rule inflation responds to the first difference in the output gap, while in the 
Phillips curve something close to the first difference of future inflation is negatively 
related to the level of the output gap. Given that both inflation and the output gap are 
highly autoregressive both because of the errors and the model dynamics, these first 
differences will be rather small; hence in the Phillips curve the level of the output gap 
                   Variables 
     
      Shocks 
      ti
~
             tx            t                 ti
~
             tx            t  
                
                  (pre-break)                                      (post-break) 
 
    Demand shock                91.3%         0%           0%                 75.4%          0%            0% 
 
     Supply shock                 5.9%          99.9%       8.4%              24%           99.1%       6.6% 
 
     Policy shock                  2.8%          0.1%         91.6%            0.5%          0.9%        93.4% 
 
  Total contribution            100%         100%        100%             100%         100%        100% 
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will largely be set by the equation (supply) error, while in the inflation rule the level 
of inflation will largely be set by that equation’s (trembling hand) policy error. If we 
now turn to the IS curve, with inflation and the output gap already set, the equilibrium 
interest rate is then recursively set in its turn by the IS curve alone. In other words, 
under the optimal policy any innovation to the demand side will be fully neutralized 
by the adjustment of the real interest rate, leaving the output gap and inflation 
unaffected. The real interest rate also responds to the expected change in output gap 
but this is small because of output gap autocorrelation. The nominal interest rate also 
responds to expected future inflation; but this is dominated by the policy error which 
dies away quickly and so moves little also. Hence the dominance of the demand shock 
on nominal interest rates; the supply shock intrudes more on interest rates in the Great 
Moderation period because it is less persistent and so the expected change in the 
output gap is larger, affecting the real interest rate more. This structure is illustrated in 
figure 4.2; derivations are shown in appendix B. 
 
                 
                  Figure 4.2: Workings of the Baseline Model in Face of Shocks          
 
                                 
                                   Panel A: When Demand Shocks Occur 
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                                    Panel B: When Supply Shocks Occur 
           
 
                           
 
 
 
 
                                    Panel C: When Policy Shocks Occur 
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To summarise, while a decline in the variances of all shocks brought about the switch 
from the Great Acceleration to the Great Moderation, our variance decomposition 
here shows that the relative impact of these shocks on the economy has been fairly 
similar over time, apart from an increase in the role of the supply shock in interest 
rates. 
 
 
4.3. The ‘Good Policy’ Explanation of the Great Moderation: a Taylor Rule 
Illusion? 
 
So far, it has been clear that our model with the optimal timeless rule can explain the 
Great Moderation, not by any change in the policy regime but rather purely through 
the changing variances of the shocks. How then can it be that economists have 
observed different Taylor rules across the two regimes and concluded from these that 
policy regime changes were at work? Our suggestion is that such apparent rules were 
statistically observable because produced by the behaviour of the economy in 
conjunction with the true (constant) monetary policy rule.    
 
The typical ‘good policy’ explanation of the Moderation relies on evidence from an 
estimated Taylor rule that is presumed to describe the true behaviour of the Fed, and 
interprets the corresponding change of the rule parameters estimated with different 
subsamples as shifts in monetary policy. However, a Taylor-type relation between the 
data may well be representing something else implied by the true model where there 
is no structural Taylor rule at all—the identification problem as discussed in Minford, 
Perugini and Srinivasan (2001, 2002) and Cochrane (2007). Such changing Taylor 
rule estimates could be an illusion arising from alterations in statistical relationships 
within the data driven by the true, unchanged policy. 
 
We can test for this within our model using the method of indirect inference. We can 
evaluate the model’s capacity to generate the Taylor-type relations that we might 
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observe in the data
21
. Table 4.9 below shows several variants of the Taylor rule that 
the data may display before and after the break based on OLS and the extent to which 
these can be explained by our model:  
 
To compare the regression results we find in the data with those commonly found in 
the US Taylor rule literature we must emphasise that for the post-82 subsample a 
linear trend is taken out of the interest rate series to ensure stationarity. When 
estimated on the stationary data we have used here, the Taylor rules obtained 
generally fail to satisfy the Taylor Principle, in much the same way as those pre-1982. 
Thus econometrically the standard estimates of the long-run Taylor rule response to 
inflation post-1982 are biased upwards. There is little statistical difference in the data 
of the two periods for estimated Taylor rule long-run responses to inflation. Table 4.9 
shows that this is exactly what our model of Fed behaviour implies. 
 
 
                               Table 4.9: ‘Taylor Rules’ Shown by Real Data (with OLS)  
                                     and Explanatory Power of the Targeting rule model 
 
 
                                        Panel A: ‘Taylor rules’ in the Great Acceleration 
 
       
      Taylor rule estimated                                x                  Adjusted
2R       Wald statistic                                                                                                                                                    
 
tttxtt ixi    1
~~
         0.09        0.06        0.90            0.84                 97.2% 
   
ttxtt xi   
~
                 0.30         0.07       0.92             0.85                96.7% 
                ttt    1              
                         
ttxtt xi     11
~
             0.60         -0.01        N/A           0.24                36.1% 
 
ttxttt xii     111
~~
       -0.11        0.06        0.82            0.83                65.6% 
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 In terms of the methodology, this involves treating, in each case, the ‘Taylor rule’ specified as the 
auxiliary model and its corresponding rule parameters estimated with real data as the ‘reality’. 
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                                         Panel B: ‘Taylor rules’ in the Great Moderation 
 
     
 Taylor rule estimated                                x                   Adjusted
2R      Wald statistic                                                                                                                                                 
 
tttxtt ixi    1
~~
        0.08        0.05        0.89            0.92                21.7% 
 
 ttxtt xi   
~
               0.07        0.06        0.93            0.90                47.4% 
                ttt    1                                      
         
ttxtt xi     11
~
             0.26        0.13         N/A           0.24               10.9% 
 
ttxttt xii     111
~~
       0.03        0.04         0.89           0.91                85% 
 
 
In both subsamples (panel A and panel B, respectively) the four hypothetical Taylor 
rules estimated with the actual data are all explained by the targeting rule model, as 
indicated by the Wald statistics, at varying confidence levels. In other words, in both 
episodes if our DSGE model is the true data-generating mechanism we would find 
such relationships in the data exactly as the data says we do.  
 
Our conclusion from this last exercise is first that econometrically Taylor rules 
changed little between the two episodes once non-stationarity is allowed for; second, 
that the Taylor rules found in the data could have been generated by the completely 
different monetary rule, the timeless optimum, that we found fits the data in general. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have attempted a fresh investigation of the reason for the shift to the 
US Great Moderation from its predecessor period, the Great Acceleration. The 
conventional DSGE approach to these episodes starts with a New Keynesian model 
including a standard Taylor rule where the level of interest rates responds to inflation; 
the output gap may also enter, and so may the lagged interest rate as a smoothing 
mechanism. It goes on to claim that the shift was the result of improved policy in the 
form of higher Taylor rule responses to inflation. We challenge this view, as we find 
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that the Fed’s policy is better understood as following an identical optimal timeless 
rule in both episodes. From this it follows that the Great Moderation was due to much 
reduced volatility of shocks.   
 
Our findings are based on the method of indirect inference in which we compare the 
simulated behaviour from the DSGE model with a VAR estimated on the actual data. 
The standard New Keynesian model with this optimal timeless rule instead of the 
Taylor rule explains the dynamics and volatility of US economy both before and after 
1982. It also explains the existence of Taylor rule regressions found in the data, and 
how the illusion of a regime switch could arise statistically. 
 
Turning to the policy interpretation of our work, we argue that in that it followed the 
optimal timeless rule the Fed did a good job during the Great Acceleration of dealing 
with the sizeable demand and supply shocks which occurred after 1972. These shocks 
had much lower variances after 1982—a key cause of the Great Moderation. However 
the fall in the variance of the monetary policy shock between the two episodes also 
suggests that the Fed’s performance improved substantially. So in our account the 
Great Moderation in output and interest rates was due to luck but the Great 
Moderation in inflation was due to better monetary management. 
 
 
 
References: 
 
Benati, Luca and Surico, Paolo (2009), ‘VAR Analysis and the Great Moderation’, in 
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 
1636-52, September 
 
Boivin, Jean and Giannoni, Marc P. (2006), ‘Has Monetary Policy Become More 
Effective?’, in The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(3), pages 
445-462, October 
 
Calvo, Guillermo, A. (1983), ‘Staggered Prices in a Utility Maximising Framework’, 
in Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 12, pp. 383-398 
 
Canova, Fabio (2005), Methods for Applied Macroeconomic Research, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 
 
  28 
Carlstrom, C. T. and Fuerst, T. S. (2008), ‘Inertial Taylor Rules: the Benefit of 
Signalling Future Policy’, in Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, May/June 
2008, 90(3, part 2), pp. 193-203 
 
Clarida, Richard, Galí, Jordi and Gertler, Mark L. (2000), ‘Monetary Policy Rules 
And Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence And Some Theory’, in The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 147-180, February 
 
Cochrane, John, H. (2007), ‘Identification with Taylor Rules: A Critical Review’, 
NBER Working Papers 13410, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
 
Foley, K. Duncan and Taylor, Lance (2004), ‘A Heterodox Growth and Distribution 
Model’, in Economic Growth and Distribution, Neri Salvadori, ed., Growth and 
Distribution Conference, University of Pisa, June 16-19, 2004 
 
Gambetti, Luca, Pappa, Evi and Canova, Fabio (2008), ‘The Structural Dynamics of 
U.S. Output and Inflation: What Explains the Changes?’, in Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(2-3), pages 369-388, 03 
 
Gourieroux, Christian and Monfort, Alain (1996), Simulation Based Econometric 
Methods, CORE Lectures Series, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
 
Gourieroux, Christian, Monfort, Alain and Renault, Eric (1993), ‘Indirect inference’, 
in Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(S), pages S85-
118, Suppl. De 
 
Gregory, Allan W. and Smith, Gregor W. (1991), ‘Calibration as Testing: Inference in 
Simulated Macroeconomic Models’, in Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 
American Statistical Association, vol. 9(3), pages 297-303, July 
 
Gregory, Allan W. and Smith, Gregor W. (1993), ‘Calibration in macroeconomics’, in 
Handbook of Statistics, G. S. Maddla, ed., 11: pp.703-719, St. Louis, MO.: Elsevier 
 
Ireland, Peter N. (2007), ‘Changes in the Federal Reserve's Inflation Target: Causes 
and Consequences’, in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, 
vol. 39(8), pages 1851-1882, December 
  
Kuester, K., Muller, G. J. and Stolting, S. (2009), ‘Is the New Keynesian Phillips 
Curve Flat?’, in Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 39-41, April 
 
Le, V. P. M., Meenagh, D., Minford, A. P. L. and Wickens, M. R. (2009), ‘Two 
Orthogonal Continents: Testing a Two-country DSGE Model of the US and the EU 
Using Indirect Inference’, Cardiff University Working Paper Series, E2009/3, March 
2009  
 
Le, V. P. M., Minford, A. P. L. and Wickens, M. R. (2010), ‘How Much Nominal 
Rigidity Is There in the US Economy? Testing a New Keynesian DSGE Model Using 
Indirect Inference’, Cardiff University Working Paper Series, E2008/32, December 
2008, updated May 2010 
 
  29 
Lubik, Thomas A. and Schorfheide, Frank (2004), ‘Testing for Indeterminacy: An 
Application to U.S. Monetary Policy’, in American Economic Review, American 
Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 190-217, March 
  
Meenagh, D., Minford, A. P. L. and Wickens, M. R. (2009), ‘Testing a DSGE Model 
of the EU Using Indirect Inference’, in Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 20(4), 
pp. 435-471, September 
 
Minford, A. P. L. and Ou, Zhirong (2010), ‘Taylor Rule or Optimal Timeless Policy? 
Reconsidering the Fed's behavior since 1982’, Cardiff University Working Paper 
Series, E2009/19, September 2009, updated May 2010 
 
Minford, A. P. L., Perugini, F. and Srinivasan, N. (2001), ‘The Observational 
Equivalence of Taylor Rule and Taylor-type Rules’, forthcoming in Progress in 
Macroeconomics Research, F. Columbus ed., New York: Nova Science Publisher  
 
Minford, A. P. L., Perugini, F. and Srinivasan, N. (2002), ‘Are Interest Rate 
Regressions Evidence for a Taylor Rule?’, in Economic Letters, Vol. 76, Issue 1, June, 
pp.145-150 
 
Minford, A. P. L., Theodoridis, K. and Meenagh, D. (2009), ‘Testing a Model of the 
UK by the Method of Indirect Inference’, in Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 
20(2), pages 265-291, April 
 
Nistico, Salvatore (2007), ‘The Welfare Loss from Unstable Inflation’, in Economics 
Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 51-57, July 
 
Primiceri, Giorgio E. (2005), ‘Time Varying Structural Vector Autoregressions and 
Monetary Policy’, in Review of Economic Studies, 72, pages 821-825, The Review of 
Economic Studies Limited 
 
Qu, Zhongjun and Perron, Pierre (2007), ‘Estimating and Testing Structural Changes 
in Multivariate Regressions’, in Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(2), pages 
459-502, 03 
 
Sims, Christopher A. and Zha, Tao (2006), ‘Were There Regime Switches in U.S. 
Monetary Policy?’, in American Economic Review, American Economic Association, 
vol. 96(1), pages 54-81, March 
 
Smith, Anthony (1993), ‘Estimating nonlinear time-series models using simulated 
vector autoregressions’, in Journal of Applied Econometrics, 8: S63—S84 
 
Stock, James H. and Watson, Mark W. (2002), ‘Has the Business Cycle Changed and 
Why?’, NBER Working Papers 9127, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 
 
Wilson, Edwin B. and Hilferty, Margaret M. (1931), ‘The Distribution of Chi-Square’, 
in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 17(12), pages 684–688, 
December, Washington 
 
 
  30 
 
Appendix: 
 
 
A. Tables and Figures 
 
 
                                Table A.1: Qu-Perron Test for Structural Break 
 
    Estimated           95% confidence interval               supLR test statistic         5% critical value 
    break date               lower             upper            for a fixed number of breaks 
        
     1984Q3                 1980Q1          1984Q4                           164.84                             31.85 
  Note: 1. Time series model: VAR(1) (without constant). 
             2. H0: there is no structural break; H1: there is one structural break. 
             3. Observation sample (adjusted): 1972Q2—2007Q4. 
 
 
 
                                      Table A.2: Unit Root Tests for Stationarity 
 
               Panel A: The Acceleration Subsample 
 
     Time series       5% critical value    10% critical value        ADF test statistics      p-values* 
       ti
~
                           -1.95                              -1.61                                    -1.71                      0.0818 
              tx                             -1.95                              -1.61                                   -1.67                       0.0901 
              t                            -1.95                              -1.61                                   -2.86                       0.0053 
Note: 1. 
ti
~  deviation of quarterly Fed rate from its steady-state value; 
tx  log difference of quarterly real  
                GDP from its HP trend; 
t  quarterly CPI inflation. 
           2. ‘*’ denotes the Mackinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
             3. H0: the time series has a unit root. 
             4. Observation sample (adjusted): 1972Q3—1982Q3. 
 
    
 
                                               Panel B: The Moderation Subsample 
 
     Time series       5% critical value    10% critical value        ADF test statistics      p-values* 
       ti
~
                          -1.94                             -1.61                                    -2.91                        0.0040 
              tx                            -1.94                             -1.61                                   -4.42                         0.0000 
              t                           -1.94                             -1.61                                   -3.34                         0.0010 
 Note: 1. 
ti
~  deviation of quarterly Fed rate from its steady-state value; 
tx  log difference of quarterly real  
                GDP from its HP trend; 
t  quarterly CPI inflation. 
           2. ‘*’ denotes the Mackinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
             3. H0: the time series has a unit root. 
             4. Observation sample (adjusted): 1982Q4—2007Q4. 
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                          Figure A.1: Time Paths of the Involved Variables  
                                              (Demeaned, Detrended Data) 
            
                                  Panel A: The Acceleration Subsample (1997Q2-1982Q3)  
                        ti
~
                                                   tx                                                         t  
             
 
 
 
                                  Panel B: The Moderation Subsample (1982Q3-2007Q4) 
                        ti
~
                                                  tx                                                         t  
           
 
Note: 
ti
~  deviation of quarterly Fed rate from its steady-state value; 
tx  log difference of quarterly real  
            GDP from its HP trend; 
t  quarterly CPI inflation. 
 
 
              
B. Analytical Derivation of responses to shocks 
 
 
a. Impulse response of inflation to shocks:  
 
Given rational expectations and equations: 
            
w
ttttt uxE   1                                         [3.2]     
            tttt xx 


   )( 1                                              [3.3]       
  
              Rewrite [3.2] as: 
              

 wtt
t
uB
x


 )1( 1
                                             ①  
  
              Also, write [3.3] as:   
              


)1(
)(



L
x ttt                                                        ② 
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              Equate ① to ② such that: 
             




)1(
)()1( 1



 
L
uB tt
w
tt                                  ③      
             
             Solve for t  from ③ to obtain: 
            
])1(1)[1( 1121
1
12






LBL
uu wt
w
tt
t 

       ④  
                 
Now note that the supply error has a high autocorrelation so that the terms in it nearly 
cancel, while also the coefficient on it (kappa) is small, leaving the policy error as the 
dominant factor in inflation. 
 
b. Impulse response of output gap to shocks:  
 
Given rational expectations and equations: 
            
w
ttttt uxE   1                                         [3.2]     
            tttt xx 


   )( 1                                              [3.3]       
  
              Rewrite [3.2] as: 
              
11 


B
ux wtt
t


                                                        ①’ 
  
             Put ①’ into [3.3] to obtain: 
              
)1()1(
)1(
1
1
LB
uB
x
w
tt
t









                   ②’ 
      
Since   ttt  1 , the term in the policy error is small and as the standard 
deviation of the supply error is also massively larger than that of the policy error, this 
supply error then dominates the output gap. 
            
 
c. Impulse response of interest rate to shocks:  
 
           Given ‘IS’ curve: 
          ttttttt vEixEx   )
~
)(
1
( 11 

                      [3.1] 
 
          Rewrite [3.1] as: 
          ttttttt vExxEi    11 )(
~
                       ①’’ 
 
          Now lead the targeting rule [3.3] for one period and take expectation at t to get: 
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          111 )(   ttttttt ExxEE 


                            ②’’ 
 
          Substitute ②’’ into ①’’ to obtain: 
          ttttttt vExxEi 


   11 ))((
~
              ③’’ 
 
          Since   ttt  1  and therefore tttE  1 , the above equals: 
          tttttt vxxEi 


    ))((
~
1                 ④’’ 
            
Note the expected change in output gap dominated by the supply error is small due to 
high autocorrelation, the standard deviation of demand error is some three times that 
of the policy error and   is large, this demand error then dominates the interest rate. 
